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This essay is an attempt at assembling readers in an ambitious and perhaps even problematic 
undertaking, namely that of critiquing systemic, pro-capitalist alternatives, without proposing in detail 
any alternative, whether systemic or anti-systemic/anti-capitalist. It starts by defining the concept of 
“alternative” via a debate within the Italian Left; then, it moves on to examine Keynesianism and 
ordoliberalism – a peculiar form of neo-liberalism – as two systemic alternatives, the first applying mostly 
to Anglo-American contexts and the latter to German-Austrian ones. The focus is on how Germany, by 
having the strongest economy in Europe, managed to transplant its own ordoliberal model of capitalism 
in the EC/EU via the Treaties, binding all EU members to an ordoliberal economic/normative 
constitution – the so-called acquis communautaire. By combining historical and theoretical 
narratives, we also explain how the social democratic, pro-Keynesian European Left has been corrupted 
by ordoliberalism adopting all of its major policy tenets, the result being loss of legitimacy in times of 
crisis and the rise of the xenophobic, extreme Right. We conclude by arguing that a genuine anti-systemic 






1. Introduction: Defining “Alternantive(s)” 
 
In a debate between Giorgio Napolitano – member of the right-wing faction of the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI) and later President of the Republic – and the late 
philosopher Norberto Bobbio, the latter queried what is it that peculiarly distinguishes 
the PCI from other parties of the European social democratic tradition. Napolitano 
replied as follows: 
a. The PCI is a mass party, and it is politically organised as such; 
b. The PCI is a political force whose ultimate aim is the radical transformation of 
society; 
c. The PCI is an internationalist force; 
d. The PCI enjoys a distinctive internal regime and costume. 
The debate took place in the late 1970s. Bobbio had no great difficulties in answering 
Napolitano’s position. He argued that the first and the third of Napolitano’s points, and 
partly also the fourth, are to be found in all major social democratic parties in Europe. 
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The second point is an interesting one and Bobbio had had some difficulties answering 
it back then, given the left-wing, communist, faction in the PCI led by Pietro Ingrao and 
the radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s in Italy and Europe with which the PCI 
had showed substantial affinity. However, he appeared to have had no such difficulties 
answering this point some ten years later, when the PCI announced that it aims at 
changing its name and identity (November 1989). “I wonder if today”, the socialist 
philosopher argued, “Napolitano would argue the same, especially that the PCI aims at 
the radical (I repeat, radical) transformation of society”1. 
Clearly, Bobbio insinuates here that the PCI did not have an alternative policy proposal 
that could alter capitalism, as a social system, in Italy. The PCI, Bobbio argued, was just 
a social democratic, reformist party like all other European social democratic parties, 
such as the British Labour Party or the German SPD. It was a party whose strategy and 
programme were confined within the boundaries of the capitalist system, its main aim 
being how to improve the system in favour of the subaltern classes, not to bring the 
subaltern classes in power in order to socialise the capitalist relations of production, 
distribution and exchange, thus establishing socialism. The peculiarities of the PCI were 
the peculiarities of Italy as a national formation, but this does not qualify it as a 
“communist party”. 
This debate is of great significance. It helps us understand how Marxist theoretical 
postulates transpire in left politics. It also serves us to proceed to define the concept of 
“alternative”. Alternative is an anti-systemic strategy that aims at altering the capitalist 
relations of production, which are based on the private ownership of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange and are at the root of the extraction of (relative 
and absolute) surplus-value (and exploitation). An alternative strategy is a strategy that goes 
beyond the confines of the capitalist mode of production aiming at constituting a radically different society 
on the bases of a socialist mode of production. It should be noted that this massive alteration of 
social and political axes can only take place at the level of nation-state first. 
Reformist socialists and philosophers, such as Bobbio, do not have such concerns or 
programme. Their strategic intent, whether in governmental power or in opposition, is 
to reform, to the extent that this is feasible, the political institutions of the country and 
advance the rights of subaltern classes and general citizenry, including the right to enjoy 
higher wages. Reformist socialists advance only what is in the context of their pro-
systemic approach2. A left reformist pro-systemic approach entails striking a balance 
                                                 
1 N. Bobbio, “Politica e ricordi,” La Stampa, 19 November 1989; also in G. Moltedo-N. Rangeri (eds.), 
Pci: la grande svolta, Roma: Edizioni associate, 1989: 148-149. Vassilis K. Fouskas has examined at length 
the transformation of Italian Communism and the relevant theoretical and political debates concerning 
its identity in his Italy, Europe, the Left. The Transformation of Italian Communism and the European Imperative, 
London: Ashgate/Routledge, 1998 (reprinted in 2019). 
2 There are, of course, many other differences between systemic and anti-systemic agencies, such as 
their analyses on the issue of the state and the dialectics between the radical anti-systemic subject and 
the capitalist state. Here we dwell on a political economy approach and we prefer not to touch upon 
this theme. However, we find of paramount importance to distinguish between state apparatus and state 
power, precisely because the latter concerns the class faction that control the state as a whole and has a 
dominant position in the social division of labour, whereas the former concept refers to the various 
branches and institutions of the state, the ministries, local government etc. We find this distinction in 
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between the interests of workers and the interests of the bourgeoisie under the 
mediating role of the nation-state. This is what is usually called “the social contract” or 
“the Keynesian consensus”. As we shall see below, the debate between Bobbio and 
Napolitano took the form it took because Keynesianism and mass politics had still an 
important presence and influence in Italy and Europe. 
We will first examine Keynesianism and ordoliberalism as systemic (capitalist) 
alternatives. Then we shall move on to explore the way in which ordoliberalism became 
the key guiding policy instrument of the European Union. In this context, the 
corruption of the European social democratic Left by ordoliberalism will be examined. 
The narrative we lay out here and the experience of the Eurozone crisis provides us with 
a great lesson, namely, that the EU/Eurozone is such a complex, disciplinarian, 
institutional-class materiality that cannot be reformed. It can only be overthrown by a 
coordination of anti-systemic movements employing anti-capitalist alternative strategies 
at the level of the nation-state first.  
 
 
2. Keynesianism and Ordoliberalism as (Systemic) Alternatives 
 
There are, therefore, anti-systemic agencies and programmes, as there are systemic ones. 
The former have, or must have, an anti-capitalist horizon, whether communistic, 
communalistic, libertarian or ecological. The latter remain within the shifting boundaries 
of capitalist development and exploitation. Capitalism is a dynamic social system that 
changes constantly. Because capitalism changes in a contradictory manner – for example, 
as it reproduces wealth it also reproduces poverty – there are differing agencies reflecting 
and shaping those contradictions. Reformists are not only to be found on the left of the 
political spectrum trying to improve the conditions of the poor and the deprived 
(socialist parties, social democratic parties, feminist movements, reformist trade unions 
fighting only for wage increases, civil rights movements etc.). Interestingly, reformism 
also flourishes on the right-wing side of politics. Even far more interestingly, key 
economic policy tenets of a socialist-reformist, systemic agenda can be shared with 
liberals and even conservative movements and parties.  
The most important contribution of Eduard Bernstein in left reformist politics is not 
so much his refutation of armed struggle as a means to changing capitalism, or his 
famous statement that “the socialist goal is nothing, the movement is everything”. 
Rather, his attack on orthodox Marxism was his revisionist stance, in the sense that the 
left-progressive agency has an almost providential obligation to revise its political 
strategy any time when capitalism changes in history. Capitalism moved from its liberal, 
free trade phase of the 19th century, to more robust forms corresponding to its extended 
reproduction and the fusion between financial and industrial capital necessitating an 
active state interventionist role also because of the First World War. Bernstein’s 
proposal corresponded to this important transformation of capitalism. In the event, as 
Donald Sassoon shows in his wide-ranging and encyclopaedic One Hundred Years of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
some rare texts of Marx on the British Constitution; later, Lenin in his The State and Revolution, but also 
other Marxists, especially Nicos Poulantzas in the late 1960s, systematised it further. 
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Socialism, German social democracy and, indeed, most European social democratic 
parties, followed Bernstein’s guidance3.  
A landmark moment in the capitalist history of the 20th century was the crisis of 
liberal politics and economics in the 1920s. This crisis brought to government right-wing 
authoritarian movements and parties, the culmination being the establishment of a Nazi 
regime in Germany in 1932-33 which imposed strict control on the economy using the 
state as the main organisational lever of economic development. Fascist, Nazi and 
dictatorial regimes in Europe between the wars advanced the social productive forces 
where economic liberalism had failed before4. For example, Germany overcame the 
impact of the crash of 1929 relatively unscathed, whereas Italy’s mezzogiorno witnessed 
significant economic development to the extent that led Antonio Gramsci, from his 
prison cell, to name these phenomena as passive revolution, because modernisation and 
development were guided by reactionary, not progressive (left-wing) forces. 
Amidst the turmoil of the inter-war period, we had had the development of two very 
important intellectual currents in politics and economics. They flourished in 
Germany/Austria and Britain. We refer to the currents of ordoliberalism and that led by 
Cambridge University economist, John M. Keynes. Keynesianism refuted Say’s law that 
free markets can equilibrate on the basis of the notion that aggregate supply creates its 
own aggregate demand. He insisted on a form of state economic management in which 
aggregate demand should be privileged so that the economic output corresponds “to full 
employment as nearly as possible”5. The balancing out of economic activity and markets, 
according to Keynes, is the result of state interference boosting aggregate demand, that 
is, labour. No accident, this was the agenda adopted virtually by all social democratic 
parties in Europe after WWII. It was under Keynesian policy-making that North 
Atlantic capitalism prospered in the 1950s and 1960s putting right-wing, liberal and 
conservative parties with their back against the wall. Boosting aggregate demand 
underpinned the Fordist model of “mass production for mass consumption” in 
industrial relations. Again, as Donald Sassoon shows in his One Hundred Years of Socialism, 
those parties, even when found themselves in office, they could hardly change the 
contours of mass society, not least because capitalist was doing pretty well: 
unemployment was very low, as was inflation, whereas both wages for workers and 
profitability in all major centres of capitalism (USA, West Germany and Japan) relatively 
high6. As the reformist social democratic Left embraced NATO, so the conservative 
Right, having no choice, embraced Keynesian policy-making. Clearly, Keynesianism is a 
pro-systemic reformist programme put together in order to save the capitalist system 
from collapse and by way of conceding some social and political power to the trade 
unions and the social democratic Left. However, the case of ordoliberalism, as a 
revisionist strategy for the entrepreneurial classes, is far more interesting and, by and 
large, under-examined.  
                                                 
3 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, London: I.B. Tauris, 1995.  
4 Among others, E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, London: Abacus, 1995. 
5 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1936/1973: 378. 
6 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism : 115-440. 
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Ordoliberalism is an intellectual and political movement whose origins can be traced 
back to in inter-war Germany and Austria. It formed an attempt to re-invent an 
inter-disciplinary and all-encompassing model of social and public policy conducive to 
practical policy application in order to steer the course of government away from the 
defunct liberalism of the 1920s7. Towards the end of the Weimar Republic and after, 
many sociologists, economists, constitutionalists and other social scientists, not 
necessarily in contact with each other, began working on theoretical hypotheses drawing 
on liberal modern traditions of the previous centuries but aiming at providing an 
inter-disciplinary synthesis going beyond those traditions. A notorious group around 
Franz Böhm and Walter Eucken was based in the University of Freiburg, hence the 
attribution of ordoliberal thinking to “Freiburg School”. The key reference point for 
ordoliberals – and the politico-economic experience to avoid – was the hyper-inflation 
of the Weimar Republic and the disorder brought about by its political, nearly anarchic, 
pluralism. The main aim of ordoliberals in Austria and Germany the 1930s came out to 
be the formation of a policy proposal that goes beyond the failed classical liberalism, but 
which is also different from the prevailing paradigms of “really existing socialism” and 
the vogue of Keynesianism as incarnated in Roosevelt’s New Deal and Keynes’ theory 
of boosting aggregate demand management via state interference and deficit spending. 
At the same time, the majority of them opposed the Nazi organisation of the German 
economy. In short, the ordoliberals were liberals but of a peculiar stock: as opposed to 
free market/free trade liberalism of the 19th century dominated by England and English 
thinkers, Austro-German “neo-liberals”/ordoliberals envisaged a social economy 
premised on order and an economic constitution that supports a healthy price mechanism and 
competition. Some ordoliberals opposed big cartels and monopolies, their thought being 
a reflection of Germany’s economic model of many SMEs. A view shared by all 
ordoliberal thinkers was that state institutions and strict legal rules are the mediums for 
instituting order, not the market itself via its spontaneous mechanisms. Ordoliberalism 
means rules over and for the market, not market rule. Markets undermine social and 
economic order and that is why a free economy requires a strong state in command, a robust 
articulation of political institutions and markets, an Ordnungsgefüge (objective order 
constellation), as Alfred Müller-Armack called it in 19328. This complex institutional 
nexus between the state and social economy draws on a “non-political”, disciplinarian 
rule of law, at the centre of which is a de-politicised central bank mechanism structured 
on an anti-inflation bias. Forms of authoritarian rule are allowed if/when the price 
mechanism, that is inflation, gets out of control and free markets and competition are 
under threat. Ordoliberalism rules via a structured order ordered by the state. This fundamental 
                                                 
7See especially, P. Mirowski-D. Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pelerin. The Making of the Neo-Liberal 
Thought Collective, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009; V.K. Fouskas-S. Roy-Mukherjee, 
“Neo-Liberalism and Ordoliberalism. One or Two Critiques? An Introduction,” Critical Sociology, First 
published online 8, April 2019 (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0896920519835008). 
8 See in particular, W. Bonefeld, The Strong State and the Free Economy, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2017. 
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principle of ordoliberal thinking brought some of them, such as Müller-Armack himself, 
very close to the Nazi party and Carl Schmitt’s theory of the “state of exception”9.  
Undeniably, this can be called nothing else but right-wing reformism cum revisionism. 
Reformism, because it seeks to reform the state-market nexus in order to achieve a more 
orderly capitalism; right-wing because the betterment of capitalism is primarily for the 
supply-side of the system, i.e., the enterprises and their personifications, the capitalists; 
and revisionist because it sets out a new policy that corresponds to a new phase of 
capitalist development after the crash of 1929, yet, a non-Keynesian policy. Overall, 
ordoliberalism is a pro-systemic alternative, but it differs from other systemic 
alternatives, such as Keynesianism and the classical liberalism of the 19th century.  
The ordoliberal reconstruction of liberal doctrines was somewhat formalised in the 
notorious “Walter Lippmann Colloquium”, or Colloque, held over five days in central 
Paris, from 26 to 30 August 1938. Most arch-ordoliberals, from Friedrich von Hayek to 
Alexander Rüstow and from Wilhelm Röpke to Ludwig von Mises, were there (Eucken 
was invited to attend but the Nazi authorities did not give him permission to leave 
Germany). Along with businessmen, French economists and philosophers, such as 
Raymond Aron, the Colloque launched effectively a neo-liberal international collective, an 
effort that the war interrupted but was to be re-launched in the Swiss resort of Mont 
Pelerin in 1947 under the leadership of von Hayek10. With the founding of the Mont 
Pelerin Society, ordoliberalism/neo-liberalism is in business simply because it began 
influencing directly post-war political establishments in Europe and the USA. Milton 
Friedman attended the opening meeting of the Society, helping him systematise neo-
liberal economics at the University of Chicago in the 1950s, whereas Ludwig Erhard, 
West Germany’s Minister of Economy from 1949 to 1963 and Chancellor from 1963 to 
1966, joined Mont Pellerin in 1950. 
Although descriptive and brief, the above discussion demolishes, among others, the 
myth that neo-liberalism is an Anglo-American phenomenon. Matters, rather, are far 
more complex and many authors have reasonable historical grounds to argue that 
neo-liberalism, in the form of ordoliberalism as it was shaped in inter-war Germany and 
Austria, preceded the neo-classical economics of the Chicago School11. Anglo-American 
neo-liberalism resulted from the German-Austrian matrix of ordoliberalism, not vice versa. Thus, both 
movements and policy proposals share many things in common, although ordoliberals 
tend to give emphasis more to the role of institutions and their disciplinarian and 
de-politicising capacity via law, whereas (Anglo-American) neo-liberals do not see free 
markets as disruptive and disorderly. For our purposes here that, among others, aim at 
showing the way in which German ordoliberalism was transposed onto EU Treaties 
over the decades since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the most significant contributions to 
                                                 
9 See W. Scheuerman, “Hermann Heller and the European Crisis. Authoritarian Liberalism 
Redux?,” European Law Journal, 21 (2/2015): 34-51. Bob Jessop’s work on the issue of 
ordoliberalism is along the same lines. See especia lly his text “Ordoliberalism and neo-
liberalization: governing through order  or  disorder,” Critical Sociology, First published online 28 
March 2019 (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0896920519834068?journalCode=crsb). 
10 P. Mirowski-D. Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pelerin : 45-67. 
11 R. Kiely, The Neo-Liberal Paradox, Cheltenhman-Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2018: 35-94. 
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ordo theory and practice, especially as regards the construction of post-war Germany 
and Europe, is that by von Hayek and Müller-Armack. 
 
 
3. The Ordoliberal Origins of the European Union 
 
The origins of the European Union today are to be found in ordoliberalism. As such, it 
is an extension of the German-Austrian model of capitalist development across the EU, 
although this does not make the EU flat or an extension of Germany. There are massive 
regional variations and discrepancies within the EU and the development, as Marx and 
Marxists have always argued, is rather both combined and uneven at the same time, hence 
the debt crisis that inflicted the EU/Eurozone and the disintegrative tendencies of 
Euro-Atlanticism as a whole12.  
In a 1939 essay titled “The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism”, Hayek 
presented a blueprint on how a European federation could work by way of removing 
impediments to the free movement of “men, goods, and capital”, as he put it13. As long 
as a “single market” is in place, Hayek wrote, prices and wages would tend to match 
production costs across the continent. All that is needed to achieve a balanced price 
system without state interference is a federal regulatory framework whose aim would be 
to reduce and even eliminate state interference, undermining state support for domestic 
industries and eliminating independent monetary policies. Effectively, Hayek advocated 
the setting up of a liberal framework of rules across Europe in order to eliminate the 
power of nation-states, making them instead serve “interstate liberal-federal” rules. 
From this perspective, national currencies and sovereignties disappear. Arguably, the 
“framework” envisaged by Hayek adumbrates nothing more and nothing less than the 
binding neo-ordoliberal Treaties of the EEC/EC/EU, which in a single market 
mechanism eliminate the power of nation-states that signed up to those Treaties. In this 
respect, monetary sovereignty is paramount: interstate (co)federal principles dictate that 
a state’s central bank liquidity and interest rate is determined by the federation’s central 
bank that sits outside the jurisdiction of that state proper. Clearly, this indicates loss of 
monetary sovereignty, which is a fundamental aspect of national sovereignty. Moreover, 
interstate (co)federalism prohibits recycling of surpluses across the (co)federated states 
and societies, thus depriving of any help the debtor states and the poor. Clearly, this is 
an anti-Keynesian principle blocking deficit spending and aid. At the same time, it 
indicates democratic deficit because the federated central bank mechanism is over and 
above any socio-political control and check, unassailable from social struggle and 
political pressures that occur within the nation-state proper. For Hayek and the 
ordoliberals, the price mechanism, that is, the control of inflation and the framework of 
rules within which a competitive order can exist and thrive, is of utmost importance. 
                                                 
12 See V.K. Fouskas-B. Gökay, The Disintegration of Euro-Atlanticism and New Authoritarinaism, London-
New York: Palgrave, 2019. 
13 We draw from F. von Hayek, “The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism,” in Id., 
Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939/1947. 
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In post-war (West) Germany, Müller-Armack was directly involved in economic 
policy and the construction of the European project. He, under the command of his 
Minister, Erhard, was Germany’s chief negotiator in the Treaty of Rome, which 
proclaims without hesitation “the establishment of a regime ensuring that competition is 
not distorted in the common market”, facilitating an increase in the “competitive 
strength of enterprises”. To this effect, state aid, considered as a factor that distorts the 
price mechanism and the market, was to be proscribed by the 1957 Treaty. Having 
established the basic economic liberties (free movement of people, capital, services and 
goods), the Treaty constitutionalised the “social market economy” notion, 
Marktwirtschaft, put forth and theorised by the German negotiator already in 1932. Ever 
since the Treaty of Rome, Marktwirtschaft represents the most fundamental aspect of 
Europe’s acquis, which is effectively the EU’s Constitution today endorsed by the 
European Court of Justice and upheld by the Commission and the Council. 
To understand Marktwirtschaft it is important that one begins to understand society not 
as an organism divided into classes and constantly permeated by class struggle – in fact, 
a Marxist would argue that classes exists only through class struggle – but as an ontology 
premised on competition, whether individual or entrepreneurial. Müller-Armack explained 
that market is “social” because it pleases the choices of the consumer and puts pressure, 
through competition, on enterprises and workers to improve productivity and quality of 
the end-product to be consumed. Keynesians and socialists criticised this by 
counter-arguing that such a postulate undermines social cohesion and solidarity and 
cannot be “social” or “socialist”. Müller-Armack responded by saying that Marktwirtschaft 
is not the same with the notion of a liberal economy, because Marktwirtschaft is desired by 
society and represents a collective choice. It is a social machine in need of a regulatory 
economic constitution, because this type of regulation orders a fair competition between 
enterprises and checks the price mechanism. In addition, this regulation-institutional 
interference aims at constructing individuals responsible for their actions, not individuals 
expecting to receive welfare benefits at the expense of the taxpayer. In effect, 
Marktwirtschaft turns the individual and his biological shelf from being an antagonist to 
the market relations and the enterprise to a co-responsible human being seeing his/her 
interests as identical with that of the market and the enterprise14. Individualism is a 
cultural condition to be constructed and not left to the spontaneous mechanism of free 
markets. In this respect, Marktwirtschaft directly opposes the Keynesian welfare state and 
socialist alternatives, as well as laissez faire. However, because of the embeddedness of the 
Bismarckian welfare state in Germany, an embeddedness that continued throughout the 
Cold War, the ordoliberals had more success in Europe with this policy notion in the 
long run, than in Germany itself.  
In the beginning, ordoliberals faced a couple of serious obstacles in Europe, especially 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Above all, they had to come to grips with the dominant 
position of Keynesian policy-making – with all its variations – within the nation-states 
and the virtuous cycle of capitalist development – the so-called “Golden Age of 
capitalism” (1945-1970). Due to the early stages of the process of European integration, 
                                                 
14 This aspect is analysed brilliantly by Michel Foucault in his pioneering analysis of ordoliberalism as 
biopolitics, M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, New York: Palgrave, 1979/2010: 33-178. 
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ordoliberals and Marktwirtschaft had to strike a compromise, especially with the French 
who, despite having problems matching the dominant position of the D-Mark in the 
common market, were extremely hesitant to give away national power without 
surrendering the D-Mark in an (exchange rate) mechanism providing currency stability 
across the common market15. Nevertheless, the ordoliberals had left an important 
imprint on the common market and its subsequent governing structures from the very 
beginning: given that the institutions of the EU did not evolve in response to class 
struggle and political-social pressures – its life began as a cartel of steel and coal which 
controlled prices and output by means of an unelected bureaucracy – it enjoyed all the 
requisites to develop into a governing aggregation of rules and norms at a later stage, 
resembling the German-Austrian ordoliberal model of capitalism. The turning points 
were the collapse of Keynesianism in the stagflation (economic stagnation accompanied 
by high inflation) of the 1970s and Francois Mitterrand’s U-turn in 1983 when, unable to 
compete with the D-mark in the EMS, abandoned his nationalisation programme and 
committed France to the single market that adumbrated the Maastricht Treaty (1991-2) 
and the launch of the Euro in 1999 (2001 for Greece). In this respect, the Growth and 
Stability Pact, formalised via Council resolution in 1997, had been the most ordoliberal 
set of rules ever.  
 
 
4. First Set of Conclusions and Key Policy Tenets of Ordoliberalism 
 
We can now draw a few conclusions. 
First, it is important to understand that German-Austrian ordoliberalism, as a systematic 
and pro-systemic elaboration of a neo-liberal thought collective in and for continental Europe, preceded 
Anglo-American neo-liberal thought and practice. This is very significant, because due to 
the linkages between ordoliberalism and policy-making, the German model of post-war 
capitalist development accommodated a number of neo-liberal elements that British 
capitalism was not able to incorporate, launching instead a welfare state and an aggregate 
demand management policy along Keynesian postulates. Neo-liberalism triumphed in 
Britain with the advent of Margaret Thatcher in power in 1979, who employed a policy 
similar to a kind of “shock therapy”, destroying the industrial capacity of the country 
and building a social economy on the dominance of financial services and the banks. In 
Germany, the transition to a full-fledged ordoliberal-cum-neo-liberal process took much 
                                                 
15 It was De Gaulle’s France, through his Finance Minister, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who in March 
1964 proposed to his German counter-part, Herr Schmücker, a common currency. This came as a 
surprise to the Germans but this sort of semi-structured and rather secret meetings continued through 
to the 1970s, when eventually an abortive EMS was established. Germany’s objection throughout had 
been that it cannot give up its currency without first putting in place a political (European) union. De 
Gaulle aimed at undermining the dominant position of the dollar as a reserve currency and wanted to 
connect Europe with the Soviet Union geo-politically. Henry Kissinger, who could see the dominant 
economic position (West) Germany was already assuming within the common market, asked De Gaulle 
how France would prevent Germany from dominating the continent. The General’s answer was: “par 
la guerre!”. See, among others, Y. Varoufakis, And the Weak Suffer what they Must?, London: Vintage, 
2016: 20-56.  
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longer, it was orderly and without destroying the exporting industrial capacity of the 
country. During the Cold War there had been a constant fight between the dominance 
of Keynesianism and the up and coming of ordoliberalism both in Germany and 
Europe. Müller-Armack’s Marktwirtschaft represented an unstable equilibrium of 
compromises with Keynesian policy-making, that is, the centrality of the welfare state, 
high wages and nationalised industry.  
The stagflation of the 1970s – economic stagnation accompanied by high inflation – 
shattered the Keynesian consensus across Europe. The capitalist system destroyed one 
of its systemic public policy alternatives, simply because capitalists and their political 
elites cannot fully control capitalism as a structural-contradictory movement. This 
historical process enthroned ordoliberalism in power, formalised in the Single European 
Act of 1986-7 and the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty was a triumph for the 
German-Austrian ordoliberalism at the European level and represents the structural and 
dominant power of German capitalism in Europe. From being a surplus state with a 
stable currency during the Cold War, Germany comes to institutionalise its primacy in 
Europe via a number of Treaties pointing to the launch of a single currency and a 
European Central Bank modelled after the Bundesbank. Obviously, the French had 
miscalculated: the single currency they proposed in the 1960s turned out to be a 
camouflaged D-Mark under the watchful eye of a strictly independent and 
“de-politicised” European Central Bank, committed to anti-inflation policies – same as 
the Bundesbank. A Treaty commitment was that surplus countries, such as Germany, 
could not bailout debtor countries, such as Italy or Greece16.  
The second major point that needs to be made is that the construction of Europe had 
been an anti-socialist/anti-Keynesian project from the very beginning, although, as we saw 
earlier an unstable equilibrium of compromises was struck between Keynesianism and 
ordoliberalism in Germany before the start of stagflation. This, and the fact that 
Keynesianism delivered prosperity for all, capital and labour, put a break on the spread 
of ordoliberal rule via the Treaties of the EEC. However, after especially the defeat of 
Miterrand’s socialist programme in France in the early 1980s, ordoliberalism unleashed. 
Importantly, as the project was unfolding through the establishment of a binding 
ordoliberal framework of rules and norms undermining state-national sovereignty – von 
Hayek’s blueprint – those signing up to those rules and norms were effectively entering 
an “iron cage” from which it was almost impossible to escape17.  
Let us lay out the key policy tenets of ordoliberalism/neo-liberalism as they result 
from our analyses. We emphasise again that all these policy tenets represent material 
constraints and constitutional commitments and are inserted in the EU Treaties binding 
all EU/Eurozone national polities to adhering to them: 
1. Sound money and anti-inflation policies 
2. Balanced budgets and exclusion of bailouts 
3. Anti-trust legislation and (fair) competition policy 
4. Complete independence of the central bank mechanism 
                                                 
16 See C. Lapavitsas, The Left Case against the EU, Cambridge: Polity, 2018.  
17 M. Ryner, “Europe’s Ordoliberal Iron Cage: Critical Political Economy, the Euro Area Crisis and its 
Management,” Journal of European Public Policy, 22 (2/2015): 275-294. 
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5. Export-led growth 
6. Rule of law, social discipline and biopolitics via Marktwirtschaft 
7. Strong institutional framework (the “economic constitution”) embedded in – and 
ordering – free markets 
Having said this, the economic and political Constitution of the EU is but a 
supply-side Constitution, overturning the demand-led democratic constitutional 
arrangements struck within the nation-states of Europe under pressure from social 
struggle. From this perspective, the EU has always had a “democratic deficit”, a 
drawback transformed into straightforward managerial authoritarianism, soon after the 
banking crisis appeared in the horizon as a result of the global financial crisis. 
 
 
5. The Making of the Ordoliberal Left: A Bird’s Eye Glimpse 
 
Political parties are agencies that always operate within a given set of 
material-institutional constraints laid out by national and international class structures 
and interests. At the same time, as active participants of social and political struggle – 
and this is valid especially for the parties of the Left – they are in a position, at least in 
theory, to push the boundaries of those constraints bringing them closer to the class 
interests these parties are committed to. The Right has a moral and class obligation to 
push the boundaries towards the maximisation of profit for the enterprises, while 
holding onto political class power; the Left has a moral and class obligation to push 
those boundaries towards high wages and social welfare. The question of state power for 
the Left, a question distinct from that of governmental power, arises always at the level 
of nation-state when a left political party is able to project the interests of the class it 
represents as broader popular-national interest – the issue of working class hegemony 
within the broad ensemble of subaltern classes – without relinquishing the primacy of 
the core class it represents – that is, the working class18. The question of socialism and 
state power arises from the moment in which the subaltern classes can suppress the 
bourgeoisie and alter the relations of production (property relations) and the markets 
corresponding to them. Historically, this issue has been posed only in radical-
revolutionary periods in world history (the Russian revolution, the Chinese revolution, 
the de-colonisation period, the Cuban revolution etc.). Here, we confine ourselves to the 
case of the social democratic, Keynesian Left. 
Sadly, the Keynesian Left, being a pro-systemic reformist movement, did not want 
to push the boundaries of capital accumulation towards a new balance of power 
between labour and capital in favour of the former during the post-stagflation years. 
As we know, Right-wing parties did, pushing towards neo-liberal/ordoliberal 
globalisation/financialisation, because this was deemed to be the remedy for the falling 
                                                 
18 We accept the distinction – see also footnote 2 – between state power and governmental power. A left-wing 
party may be in governmental power but without controlling key sections of the bourgeois state power, 
such as the Ministry of Defence or the Interior Ministry. Also, it may not be in a position to organise 
the national economy alongside socialist principles due to a lack of hegemonic support in society. 
Antonio Gramsci has elaborated the issue of class hegemony in his Quaderni del carcere. The bibliography 
on these themes is immense.  
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tendency of the (average) rate of profit. But problems do not end here. The parties of 
the Left not only did fail to push the class boundaries of capitalism in favour of the 
subaltern classes, but also contributed to the shaping and strengthening of those 
boundaries together with the neo-liberal Right against the class and popular interests they 
supposedly represented. Let us have a brief look at that process. 
The German SPD was not the kind of party that could push class boundaries in 
favour of the working class and its allies. Bound by its reformist-revisionist tradition of 
Eduard Bernstein – “the movement is everything, the end-aim (of socialism) nothing” – 
the SPD at its Bad Godesberg programme of 1959 abandoned not just class struggle and 
nationalisations but, in a significance concession to the ordoliberalism of Marktwirtschaft, 
its programme will state most dramatically that Germany needs “as much competition as 
possible and as much planning as necessary”19. German trade unions were incorporated 
not only into government, but were also placed into boardrooms, “where unionists sat 
next to company directors, delivering wage restraint in return for power”20.  
French neo-revisionism, as we briefly stated above, began with the abandonment of 
the Keynesian programme by Mitterrand in 1983. In Britain, matters were more 
complicated. The Labour Party had laid the foundations of the British welfare state in 
the 1940s, and the 1960s and 1970s were dominated by Labour governments resisting 
neo-liberal reform, whether it was coming through the country’s EEC membership or 
through internal pressure. It took the party sixteen years from 1979 – when it lost power 
to Thatcher’s triumphant neo-liberal project amid a dramatic economic crisis – to come 
to grips with its commitment to socialism and nationalisations, abolishing the famous 
“clause 4” in 1994 under the neo-revisionist “Third Way” leadership of Tony Blair. This 
neo-revisionist act, a direct concession to German ordoliberalism rather than Anglo-
American neo-liberalism as we shall see below, paved Blair’s way to governmental 
power21. Effectively, the Labour Party did not simply accept the new constraints 
imposed by Thatcher’s neo-liberal reforms, setting out the new boundaries within which 
the political and economic game should take place; in the event, it began a journey as an 
active institutional participant in shaping and strengthening neo-liberal financialisation 
from positions of governmental power. Under Tony Blair, the Labour Party became part 
and parcel of the process of neo-liberal financialisation adopting key tenets of German 
ordoliberal EU, something which Thatcher fought against.  
We should not forget that Britain is a very peculiar case. Historically, Britain has 
always been with one foot in Europe and with the other in the world as a global imperial 
power. She preferred to manage German affairs and expansionist designs in East-Central 
Europe and the Balkans via France, and French affairs and designs via Germany. An 
off-shore balancer, Britain mastered the largest formal empire in history, only to lose its 
primacy and retreat, like other European colonial powers, after WWII. Because of its 
                                                 
19 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism : 250. 
20 Y. Varoufakis, And the Weak Suffer what they Must? : 63. 
21 We insist on this point: Blair was and remains the most ardent supporter in Britain of the Germany 
model of capitalism and efficiency, witness the fact of his pro-Remain campaign over the issue of 
Brexit today in Britain, undermining the Labour Party of Jeremy Corbyn, which tries to abolish 
austerity via a left Keynesian agenda. This, certainly, cannot take place within the EU, but this is 
something we cannot discuss in detail here.  
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geographical position, naval-commercial power and the role of the City as the globe’s 
main financial centre, Britain has always had a lukewarm relationship with Europe. 
Edward Heath, Britain’s conservative PM in 1973 and the most pro-European Prime 
Ministers Britain ever had, managed to overcome French – and inner-party – objections, 
achieving EEC membership. Labour had had the same internal divides, but the socialist 
star of Labour politics, Tony Benn, vehemently criticised the European project as a 
capitalist and undemocratic endeavour. Thatcher herself – although she and the majority 
of her ruling group were arch neo-liberals inspired by von Hayek’s work – never agreed 
to concede monetary sovereignty to Brussels and, via it, to Germany. In her last 
parliamentary speech on 22 November 1990, she would argue that Europe’s future 
central bank would be accountable to no parliament and such a bank would be 
completely undemocratic 22. 
She was right. Not because she had any intention to criticise the EU from reformist 
social democratic positions, as Tony Benn and others were doing at the time, but 
because her ideological formation and political aim was to sustain a neo-liberal project at 
home under the aegis of Westminster, while re-launching Britain as a neo-imperial 
power abroad re-imagining/re-inventing empire driving global finance. There are 
elements of realism in Thatcher’s view. By turning Britain into the globe’s financial hub 
in the era of globalisation, Thatcherite neo-liberalism wanted to turn Britain into the 
gatekeeper of financialisation and supply-chains of global production networks, 
by-passing Europe that was being dominated by Germany anyway. However, Blair’s 
“Third Way” neo-revisionism went beyond Thatcher’s Euroscepticism, embracing the 
ordoliberal agenda comprehensively23. 
Blair’s new Labour Party assumed office in 1996, in the midst of Bill Clinton’s 
successful Presidential terms and when the bubble of neo-liberal financialisation was in 
full swing. The Wall Street and the City of London had already become the hubs of a 
triumphant global capitalism, delivering prosperity, low inflation, high financial profits, 
easy borrowing at teaser interest rates and all this in a global environment freed from any 
global competitor after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. It seemed 
like the “end of history” was at hand. Unimpeded, NATO and the EEC/EU headed 
eastwards, providing new members with security and neo-liberal conditionality: you 
reform your economy in a free market direction “becoming prosperous like us”, and 
                                                 
22 Thatcher answered the question by Alan Beith – a Liberal Democrat – about whether she would 
continue her fight against a single currency and an independent central bank – as follows (before she 
could answer, another MP interjected: “No, she’s going to be a governor”): “What a good idea”, 
Thatcher boasted, answering to the interjection. “I had not thought of it. But if I were, there would be 
no European Central Bank accountable to no one, least of all to national parliaments. Because under 
that kind of central bank there will be no democracy [and the central bank] taking powers away from 
every single parliament and be able to have a single currency and a monetary policy and an interest rate 
policy that takes away from us all political power” (readers should visit YouTube and type into the 
search box “Margaret Thatcher’s last speech as PM”). 
23 After the Brexit vote of summer 2016, Blair fought for a second referendum hoping to “withdraw 
the withdrawal”, as the late Stephen Haseler put it to V.K. Fouskas in a private conversation; see also 
V.K. Fouskas, “Against a second Brexit referendum,” opendemocracy.net, First published online 1, 
December 2018, (https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/against-second-brexit-
referendum/).  
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then you join the two clubs. Interestingly, what triggered the bombing of Belgrade and 
Yugoslavia in 1999 by NATO forces was the refusal on the part of the Yugoslav 
delegation at Rambouillet of the so-called “Appendix B” , which stipulated, among 
others, that Yugoslavia should accept free market economic principles (the other two 
conditions were that within three years the Kosovars should be given the chance of 
voting for independence and possible annexation to Albania; and that NATO forces 
should be given permission to deploy not only in Kosovo but anywhere in Yugoslavia). 
Blair’s new Labour Party was one of the most hawkish advocates of NATO’s bombing 
campaign, a fact that demonstrated clearly that “Third Way” lacks any separate foreign 
policy instrument, as this is nothing more and nothing less but mere neo-imperialism led 
by the USA in post-Cold War conditions24. But did “Third Way” have a distinct, 
progressive economic and social policy? 
Tony Blair did not challenge the global neo-imperial role Thatcher envisaged for 
Britain in the context of neo-liberal financialisation. However, he saw that role as 
supplementing Britain’s role in the EU. In this respect, he had been Britain’s ordoliberal 
politician par excellence. In more than one occasion, and having abolished the Labour 
Party’s constitutional commitment to socialism as enshrined in clause 4 before he 
assumed office, he stressed that  
 
“old fashioned state intervention did not and cannot work. But neither does naïve reliance on 
markets. The government must promote competition, stimulating enterprise, flexibility and 
innovation by opening markets (…) In government, in business, in our universities and throughout 
society we must do much more to foster a new entrepreneurial spirit”25. 
 
Revealingly, in June 1998, Blair signed jointly with Gerhard Schroeder, Germany’s 
chancellor and SPD leader, a “working paper” laying out in full the ordoliberal agenda 
of the Left in Europe26. The initiative was sponsored by the SPD’s think-tank, Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung. The “trademark of this approach”, the two leaders argued, is the “New 
Centre” in Germany and the “Third Way” in Britain. And after confirming that both 
political forces “share a common destiny within the European Union”, they go on to 
assert that “the essential function of the market must be complemented and improved 
by political action, not hampered by it”. Moreover, public expenditure is not an end in 
itself but must be used in order to “enable people to help themselves”. In a direct attack 
on the welfare state, both leaders argued that “universal safeguards”, must cease to be 
the norm; in their stead, what needs to be promoted is the “importance of individual and 
business enterprise to the creation of wealth”. “Left-wing” ideas, the paper continued, 
“should not become an ideological straitjacket” and globalisation should be promoted 
by government action that “create conditions in which existing business can prosper and 
adapt, and new businesses can be set up and grow” by way of boosting “efficiency, 
competition and high performance”. And in an attempt to address Europe’s 
                                                 
24 On the concept of neo-imperialism, see V.K. Fouskas-B. Gökay, The New American Imperialism. Bush’s 
War on Terror and Blood for Oil, Westport CT: Praeger, 2005. 
25 Cited in A. Finlayson, Making Sense of New Labour, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2003: 177-178. 
26 T. Blair-G. Schroeder, “Europe. The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte,” Working Document No 2, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 1998 (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedafrika/02828.pdf). 
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unemployment challenge, which is “far too high” in some countries, the authors 
revealingly state: “To address this challenge, Europe’s social democrats must together 
formulate and implement a new supply-side agenda for the Left”, setting out a “robust 
competitive market framework” (our emphasis). This “supply-side agenda” is essential as 
it will put a break on the government’s borrowing requirement, addressing the issue of 
debt. Deficit spending – one of the pillars of Keynesianism – should be avoided. 
Further, high taxation on corporations is excluded, because they lower profits and 
competitiveness, while jeopardising jobs. Having a part-time job is better than having no 
job at all and “flexible markets are a modern social democratic aim”. The joint paper 
goes on to explain the notions of “human and social capital”, two fields that in a 
“modern service and knowledge-based economy” mean continuous education and 
vocational training, whereas public investment should be well-calculated and “directed at 
activities most beneficial to growth and fostering necessary structural change”.  
Blair joins openly the agenda of Europe’s ordoliberal Left embracing all of its 
postulates. Crucially, both leaders avoid to tackle perplexing issues, such as the role of 
the ECB or the constraints imposed on each EU government by the EU’s ordoliberal 
acquis, issues that Thatcher tackled head on by denouncing close links with the “Brussels 
bureaucracy” as unaccountable and undemocratic. At times, he – and Schroeder, for that 
matter – conceive of the EU and the regulatory framework it provides somewhat 
disingenuously, when they state that “companies must not be gagged by rules and 
regulations”, as if they were unaware of the EU’s cumbersome competition policy and 
anti-trust legislation.  
At home, Blair followed a two-prong ordoliberal policy. On the one hand, he 
conceded operational independence to the Bank of England to set interest rates in order 
to keep inflation under control but, on the other, he actively promoted asset price 
inflation, especially in the housing sector, a key feature of the financialisation bubble in 
the Anglo-American world and elsewhere, such as Spain. Thus, when the neo-imperial 
financialisation chain blew up in 2007-08 necessitating the pumping of trillions of 
taxpayer money into the banking sector to save capitalism from total collapse, neither 
Schroeder ’s “New Centre” nor Blair’s “Third Way” should be considered as innocent. 
They were directly involved in the shaping of neo-liberal globalisation/financialisation 
by way of not just adopting the ordoliberal book in its entirety, but also by contributing 
to the writing of its very rules and misleading the public who voted for them.  
The punishment, as well all know, did not take long to come. One after the other, the 
ordoliberal/neo-revisionist Left parties across Europe collapsed, creating ample space 
for the emergence of the radical-xenophobic Right, but also of the radical Left. In some 
cases, such as the British Labour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, 
ordoliberal left principles became thwarted from within the party. In other cases, such as 
in Spain, new radical-left aggregations were born, contesting enduring austerity and 
bondage. In Greece, Syriza, a promising radical party, swept to power in January 2015 
on an anti-austerity agenda, only to capitulate, after six months of bitter negotiations 
with the troika and after over-turning a popular referendum outcome that voted against 
ordoliberal austerity. At any event, the Eurozone crisis was not just a lesson for the 
ordoliberal European Left. It represents a lesson for the ordoliberal movement as a 
whole. For all the safety valves and regulation guarantees offered by the strong hand of 
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the ECB, the Commission, the Council and the European Court of Justice, free market 
capitalism proved to be an animal too difficult to be tamed. The ordoliberal Treaties of 
the EU proved to be useless pieces of paper, not worthy the ink and the paper upon 
which they were penned down. The banking sector of the North Atlantic area was 
extremely intertwined – this is, in fact, one of the key dimensions of financialisation. In 
the end, it required massive cynicism cum political anxiety on the part of the European 
elites to launch an entire operation in which the core surplus states of the EU could 
displace their banking crisis to periphery states (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal), 
imposing on them unprecedented austerity measures through bailout agreements offered 
and forced on humiliating, neo-colonial terms.  
 
 
6. By Way of a Conclusion: 
On What Basis Can the Left Re-Launch an Alternative Radical Project in Europe? 
 
We have put forth the following arguments: 
First, taking advantage from a debate within the Italian Left, and following a political 
economy analysis drawn from the Marxist tradition, we saw that “alternatives” can be 
systemic and anti-systemic. An anti-systemic alternative requires a rupture with the capitalist mode 
of production, whereas a systemic one does not. We have also reviewed briefly Bernstein’s work, 
which argues that when capitalism changes the strategy of the socialist party must also 
change. Following Bernstein’s guidance, the reformist/systemic Left had changed and 
adapted its political strategy in order to accommodate within the newly formed policy 
constraints imposed by the capitalist system as it developed in the 20th century. 
We have also focused on two very important pro-systemic alternatives, Keynesianism 
and ordoliberalism, both developed during the inter-war period but implemented, 
especially in Europe, after WWII. In particular, we shed light on German-Austrian 
ordoliberalism deciphering its intellectual premises, policy tenets and innovative 
approach to supply-side economics. We have argued that Germany began exporting her 
ordoliberal public policy model after the breakdown of the Keynesian consensus in the 
mid-1970s and the failure of Mitterrand’s socialist party in France to deliver 
nationalisations and pro-welfare reforms. The creation of the single market and the 
Treaty of Maastricht was a triumph of German ordoliberalism across Europe. All 
EC/EU Treaties and directives, in other words, the entire acquis communautaire, are 
ordoliberal institutional structures and it is in this sense that Germany dominates the 
EU. 
By looking at the German SPD and the British Labour Party, we have argued that the 
pro-systemic, reformist and neo-revisionist Left across the EU had not only adopted the 
neo-liberal policy directives stemming from the world of financialised capitalism, but 
also contributed to the shaping and advancement of its boundaries from governmental 
positions, the typical cases being Germany’s SPD and the British Labour Party under 
Tony Blair. 
We have affirmed that the EU and, for that matter, the Eurozone operates within 
strict ordoliberal rules on grounds of an economic constitution based on low inflation, 
low wages, fair competition policies and export-led growth. Because of its ordoliberal 
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bias, social economy and economic institutions should be completely de-politicised: 
social and political struggle and negotiation are not permissible interactions under 
ordoliberal disciplinarian and technocratic regimes. Further, Europe’s economic 
constitution, because it is ordoliberal and anti-Keynesian, allows no state aid and no 
recycling of surpluses from surplus to deficit states. Thus, in times of crisis, the 
reinforcement of this constitution brings about the bondage of austerity, which is a new 
authoritarianism 27. Pro-systemic reformist parties across the EU have adopted entirely the 
authoritarian agenda of imperial bondage and austerity, the result being the creation of a 
massive space on the left and the right of political spectrum which radical parties of the 
Left and Right can occupy28. For the time being, it is the extreme xenophobic Right that 
has mostly taken advantage of this political vacuum. The radical Left, especially after the 
capitulation of Syriza in Greece in summer 2015, continues to lose support.  
What, then, needs to be done? The simple answer is that the radical anti-systemic Left 
should start from home, that is, the level of nation-state. A more complex answer 
requires an advancement of the narrative and the positions we have upheld so far.  
The Greek experience shows that the EU cannot be reformed from within. This was 
not just because Greece was a small state, so other bigger EU states have better chances. 
This is a wrong conclusion to be drawn. Bigger states can only get better deals even by 
way of somewhat by-passing the normative framework of the Treaties (this happened 
many times in the past, especially with France). But bigger states cannot get rid of the 
Treaties that have signed up to. Thus, with the passage of time, even bigger EU states 
would be losing bargaining chips in their negotiations with Germany/European 
Commission. The economic constitution of Europe is a complex institutional materiality 
cut across by transnational class interests that stand against income distribution, that is, 
any form of Keynesian-socialist contract. This bureaucratic and class complexity is 
upheld by myriad of rules and norms, endorsed by the European Court of Justice, the 
Council and the Commission and, significantly, by the banking sector and a central bank 
tailored after Germany’s Bundesbank. These are wholly de-politicised apparatuses, 
lacking democracy and any form of democratic accountability. The European Central 
Bank sets the interest rate across the Eurozone and even defines the movement of 
non-EU currencies that have pegged themselves against the Euro. There is no 
national-popular sovereignty. To all intents and purposes, these Euro-institutions are 
unreformable. Herein lies the utopia of those who believe that a European Keynesian 
state re-distributing wealth and transferring the function of the Keynesian state at pan-
                                                 
27 A number of new Treaties have come into force after the advent of the Eurozone crisis, such as the 
European Semester programme and the Fiscal Compact, tightening the control of governments by the 
Commission alongside a programme of pan-European austerity that no-one knows or can predict how 
long it will last. These are deeply authoritarian/disciplinarian procedures imposing almost neo-colonial 
controls on the governments of the EU/Eurozone. We have examined these processes and new 
Treaties in our The Disintegration of Euro-Atlanticism.  
28 See V.K. Fouskas-C. Dimoulas, “Imperial bondage: austerity in Greece, 2008-2018,” in R. Sturm-T. 
Griebel-T. Winkelmann (eds.), Austerity: A Journey to an Unknown Territory. Discourses, Economics and 
Politics, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017: 191-212. An interesting approach to ordoliberalism as a regulatory 
model drawn from a Polanyian tradition is developed by M. Markantonatou, “The state and modes of 
regulation in Greece from the post-war period to the 2009 financial crisis,” Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, 14 (4/2012): 416-432. 
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European level is possible. This, nevertheless begs the question: How can a radical 
alternative moving beyond capitalism start at the moment when even Keynesian 
instruments at state level are absent (e.g. a national central bank, control of the national 
budget, the right to nationalise etc.)? 
This question is a matter of political-strategic intervention and programme. Politics 
and left-wing politicians that still have an anti-systemic alternative vision, that is, a design 
outlining the contours of a different society beyond capitalist profiteering, they should 
find ways to inspire what Gramsci used to call “the national-popular” as the first step 
towards the realisation of that design. We have to start from the “national-popular”, 
because there is no such a thing as European demos. Building a Euro-Keynesian Left is 
more utopian than a programmatic claim aspiring to build communism in the USA. If 
this is correct, and given the crisis of financialised capitalism and the rise of China, then 
the issue of the “radical transformation of society”, over which Napolitano and Bobbio 







                                                 
29 One could argue that radical right-wing movements have also an anti-systemic character: they fight 
against the corruption of politicians and the rich club of European elites, oppose the EU and the Euro, 
protect local workers against illegal immigration etc. No doubt, alt-Right movements and xenophobic 
parties have a strong racist and supremacist component. At the same time, they are against 
neo-liberalism and ordoliberalism, such as the AfD (Alternative for Germany) party in Germany or 
Marine Le Pen’s party in France (similar movements there are in Hungary, Poland, Greece and 
elsewhere in Europe, especially in Italy). However, these parties, although against neo-liberalism and 
the EU, are not anti-systemic on the basis of the definition we have provided here, a definition that 
draws from Marxism. They do not possess an alternative/anti-systemic strategy. Anti-systemic 
movements are anti-capitalist movements aspiring to build a society that goes beyond the capitalist 
division of labour and exploitation. Thus, radical anti-capitalists in Europe today have every reason to 
say both “Migrants Welcome” and put forth an agenda for exit from the EU/Eurozone in order to 
start building socialism at home first.  
